THE UNREASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY: THE
"NEw" NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT REEVALUATES
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS

INTRODUCTION

The principles of federalism' provide that a state, through
interpretation of its own constitution, may grant its citizens rights and
protections supplemental to those granted in the United States
Constitution.' State courts have interpreted expansively their state
See U.S. CONST. amend. X.

The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he

powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id. Federalism is
a "[t]erm which includes interrelationships among the states and relationship
between the states and the federal government." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 612 (6th
ed. 1990); see alsoJohn C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s,
23 IND. L. REv. 27, 27 (1998) (finding that the Supreme Court, through its recent
federalism rulings, has "sought to protect the institutional independence of the
states").
2 See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions
and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977) (encouraging state courts to rely on
their own state constitutions to furnish protections additional to those provided by
the United States Constitution). Some state courts have heeded the advice ofJustice
Brennan and looked to their own state constitutions to supplement federal rights.
See, e.g., State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671-72 (Idaho 1991) (holding that the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply under the Idaho
Constitution). The Idaho Supreme Court declared that "[i]t is by now beyond
dispute that this Court is free to interpret our state constitution as more protective of
the rights of Idaho citizens than the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
the federal constitution." Id. at 666 (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 80-82 (1980)). The NewJersey Supreme Court has been at the forefront of
this trend in almost all areas of constitutional law. Compare Robinson v. Cahill, 32
N.J. 473, 520, 303 A.2d 273, 297 (1973) (guaranteeing the constitutional right of
every child in New Jersey to receive a thorough and efficient education) with San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding that
education is not a fundamental right); compare Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287,
293, 450 A.2d 925, 928 (1982) (extending to economically deprived women the
guarantee of access to medically necessary abortions) with Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 326 (1980) (refusing to extend the abortion right identified in Roe v. Wade to
require access to abortion for economically deprived women); compare State v.
Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 568, 423 A.2d 615, 632-33 (1980) (extending free speech
protections to include political speech in quasi-public private property, including a
university campus) with International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,
505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) (holding that an airport is not a public forum requiring
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constitutions, particularly in the legal contexts of criminal procedures
and right to privacy.4 Many states adhere to federal doctrine when
interpreting their own state charters.5 New Jersey, in contrast, has
developed a reputation as one of the more liberal6 jurisdictions in the
country with respect to the protections and rights it affords under
state law,' especially to criminal defendants." Esteemed justices of the
access for free speech activities).
3 CompareState v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 75-76 (Mont. 1995) (holding that,
under
the Montana Constitution, persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy in areas
beyond the curtilage surrounding their home that indicate unmistakably that entry is
not permitted) with Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (finding that
the reasonable expectation of privacy did not extend to areas outside of the curtilage
immediately surrounding one's home); compare State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889, 907
(Haw. 1995) (holding that, under the Hawaii Constitution, the prosecution is
required to show inevitable discovery by clear and convincing evidence before the
court will admit any evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's Hawaii or
United States constitutional rights) with Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)
(holding that the applicable government burden in inevitable discovery issues is the
preponderance of the evidence standard). Nevertheless, some state courts have not
extended additional protection under their state constitutions. Compare Moran v.
State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 541 (Ind. 1995) (holding that, under the Indiana
Constitution, a warrantless search of garbage by the police does not violate the
reasonable expectation of privacy) with California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40
(1988) (determining that persons do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
garbage placed outside the curtilage of their homes).
The term "right to privacy" is defined as "encompassing various rights
recognized to be inherent in concept of ordered liberty, and such right prevents
governmental interference in intimate personal relationships or activities." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (6th ed. 1990). Although the United States Supreme Court
has found that "there is no 'right of privacy' found in any specific guarantee of the
Constitution, the Court has recognized that 'zones of privacy' may be created by
more specific constitutional guarantees and thereby impose limits upon government
power." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-53 (1973)). The right to privacy dates back over 110 years. See generally Samuel
D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)
(suggesting that a right to privacy does exist within the law). The New Jersey
Supreme Court also has supplemented federal rights in the area of privacy. Compare
State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 220, 381 A.2d 333, 342 (1977) (protecting from
prosecution certain consensual adult sexual activities occurring within the zone of
privacy) with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986) (holding that not all
activities that occur in private, such as homosexual sodomy, are protected by the
right to privacy).
SeeJames A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,90 MICH. L.
REv. 761, 780-84 (1992) (observing broad state-court dependence on federal
constitutional law).
6 "Liberal," in this context, has been defined as "expand[ing] the meaning
of
the statute to meet cases which are clearly within the spirit or reason of the law, or
within the evil which it was designed to remedy, provided such an interpretation is
not inconsistent with the language used." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 313 (6th ed.
1990).
See Steven A. Bank, Federalizing the Tax-Free Merger: Toward an End to the
Anachronistic Reliance on State Corporation Laws, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1307, 1374 n.371
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NewJersey Supreme Court have cultivated this liberal reputation over
the past several decades.9 Recently,'0 however, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has appeared to depart from the liberalism the court
once embraced."
(1999) (revealing that New Jersey has enacted the most liberal corporate law statute
to date); Mike Artinian et al., Survey of 1998 Non-Profit Case Law (January-June), 33
U.S.F. L. REV. 231, 258 (1999) (determining that New Jersey's charitable immunity
laws are liberally construed);John B. Wefing, The New Jersey Supreme Court 1948-1998:
Fifty Years of Independence and Activism, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 701, 730 (1998) (concluding
that the New Jersey Supreme Court has a national reputation as a leading liberal
reformist court); Marie L. Garibaldi, The Rehnquist Court and State ConstitutionalLaw,
34 TULSA L.J. 67, 78 (1998) (noting that New Jersey "has more liberal criteria for
standing to challenge the validity of a search than those under the Federal
Constitution"). But see Gary K. Wolinetz, NewJersey Slavery and the Law, 50 RUTGERS L.
REv. 2227, 2258 (1998) (observing that the New Jersey Supreme Court exercised
extreme judicial restraint in upholding federal laws designed to maintain the
practice of slavery).
8
See generally Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of
FundamentalRights, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 707 (1983). Compare State v. Tucker, 136 N.J.
158, 166, 642 A.2d 401, 405 (1994) (holding that under the NewJersey Constitution
a seizure does not require application of physical force or a showing of authority to
which the suspect yields) with California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991)
(holding that under the United States Constitution a seizure requires the application
of physical force or a showing of authority to which the suspect yields); compare State
v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 157-58, 519 A.2d 820, 856-57 (1987) (rejecting the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule governing searches performed without
probable cause) with United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984) (establishing a
good faith exception to the probable cause requirement regarding search warrants);
compare State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 227, 440 A.2d 1311, 1319 (1981) (holding that
persons with an ownership or possessory interest in the area searched have standing
to challenge the search's validity) with United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85
(1980) (holding that the exclusionary rule only protects those individuals whose
Fourth Amendment rights have been violated).
9 See Kathy Barrett Carter, Justice Handler, Voice of Liberals, to Quit High
Court,
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),June 5, 1999, at 1; David Warsh, Judges Can Be BestJudge
of Equality, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 9, 1996, at 6 (stating that former New Jersey Supreme
CourtJustice Frederick Hall, a passionate liberal, sought to persuade other members
of the court that exclusionary zoning is a form of segregation); James H. Andrews,
For Whizzer's Seat, No Bench Warmer, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 26, 1993, at 14
(finding that former New Jersey Supreme Court Justice William Brennan became
one of the most liberal voices on the United States Supreme Court); Andrea Sachs,
The First Family of New Jersey Law, Bus. FOR CENT. N.J.,June 10, 1992, at 31 (writing
that former NewJersey Supreme Court ChiefJustice Robert Wilentz led the court in
a liberal direction).
10For the purposes of this Comment, the term "recently" refers to actions and
decisions by the New Jersey Supreme Court during the 1997-1998 and 1998-1999
terms.
I See State v. Donis, 157 N.J. 44, 54, 723 A.2d 35, 40 (1998) (finding that the state
constitution permits police officers to use on-board computers to conduct random
inquiries based on a vehicle's license-plate characters without first observing a motor
vehicle violation); NewJersey Transit PBA Local 304 v. NewJersey Transit Corp., 151
N.J. 531, 564-65, 701 A.2d 1243, 1259-60 (1997) (holding that random, suspicionless
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Membership changes within the NewJersey Supreme Court may
best account for the apparent departure from its liberal ideology.
Governor Christine Todd Whitman appointed Attorney General
Deborah Poritz as chief justice in 1996,2 and earlier, in 1994,
appointed to the court Appellate Division Judge James Coleman.
With additional opportunities to shape the New Jersey Supreme
Court, Governor Whitman appointed to the bench Attorney General
Peter Verniero 14 and Appellate Division Judge Virginia Long. 5 Given
these appointments of moderate jurists, New Jersey's legacy of
liberalism in the sphere of privacy protection and criminal procedure
appears to be coming to a close.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the history of New Jersey
jurisprudence regarding Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey
Constitution, and will focus particularly on the court's unique
approach when deciding whether to amplify federally guaranteed
protections. Part II will scrutinize three recent opinions in which the
NewJersey Supreme Court refused to interpret Article I, paragraph 7
of the New Jersey Constitution as more protective of the right to
privacy than is the United States Constitution. This Comment
concludes with an attempt to decipher the extent to which
drug testing of New Jersey Transit police officers does not violate the reasonable
expectation of privacy under the state constitution); State ex rel. J.G., N.S. and J.T.,
151 N.J. 565, 594, 701 A.2d 1260, 1274-75 (1997) (upholding a New Jersey statute
compelling HIV testing of accused and convicted sex offenders provided that
probable cause of exposure could be adduced).
12 See Rocco Commarere, Poritz Court Takes Shape, 6 N.J. LAW., Aug.
25, 1997, at 1
(noting confusion as to whether the New Jersey Supreme Court under Chief Justice
Poritz is conservative or liberal based on its rulings in the 1996-1997 term); see also
Henry Gottlieb, The Wilentz Court Evolves Under Poritz, 151 N.J. L.J. at 217 (Jan. 19,
1998) (finding that the court under ChiefJustice Poritz is beginning to show a trend
toward deference to other branches of government).
13 See Kimberly J. McLarin, Judge Named by Whitman to Top Court, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
4, 1994, at B1 (reporting that Justice Coleman had developed a reputation as a
moderate jurist prior to his appointment to the NewJersey Supreme Court).
14 See Verniero Gets on Court Barely, NAT'L L.J., May 24, 1999, at A6 (reporting
that the State Senate barely confirmed Attorney General Peter Verniero because of
his lack of experience and his handling of the issues concerning racial profiling by
state police); David Kocieniewski, Whitman Narrowly Wins Fight to Put Verniero on Top
Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1999, at B2 (remarking that a Republican-controlled New
Jersey Senate narrowly approved Attorney General Peter Verniero's appointment to
the New Jersey Supreme Court); Thomas Zolper, Black Clergy Group Opposes Verniero
Bid, THE REcoRD (Hackensack, N.J.), May 8, 1999, at A3 (finding that AfricanAmerican leaders expressed disappointment over Attorney General Peter Verniero's
handling of racial profiling among NewJersey State Troopers).
15 See generally Michael Booth, Little Debate as Long Sails Through Senate Judiciary
Committee Hearing, 158 N.J. L.J. at 1105 (June 21, 1999) (discussing the appointment
of Appellate Division Judge Virginia M. Long to the NewJersey Supreme Court).
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membership changes within the court, and other practical
considerations, have affected the court's apparent narrowing of state
privacy protections.
I. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER THE
NEWJERSEY CONSTITUTION

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution contain almost
identical wording concerning protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures.'6 Despite the similar phrasing, the New Jersey
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court, until recently,7
have offered drastically dissimilar interpretations of these clauses.
State v. Johnson' is one of the earlier cases to distinguish New Jersey's
expansive privacy protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' 9 In Johnson, the State, relying upon the consent of the
Article I, paragraph 7 of the NewJersey Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the papers and things to be seized.
N.J. CONST. art. I, 1 7. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
similarly provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
16

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

17 See Robert H. Hobgood, 1-95 A/K/A the Drug Trafficker's
Freeway, and Its Impact
on State ConstitutionalLaw, 21 CAMPBELL L. REv. 237, 268 (1999) (noting that the New
Jersey Supreme Court's interpretation of Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey
Constitution is more expansive than the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment with respect to criminal defendants).
68 N.J. 349, 346A.2d 66 (1975).
See Catherine Twitero, Note, The Future of Vehicle Consent Searches in Minnesota:

State v. George, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1155, 1163 (1998) (explaining that both
the New Jersey Supreme Court and the Mississippi Supreme Court have decided to
supplement federal protections concerning consent searches by requiring that the
subject of the search have knowledge of the right to deny consent); Kenneth J.
Melilli, Exclusion of Evidence in FederalProsecutions on the Basis of State Law, 22 GA. L.
REv. 667, 682 n.92 (1988) (noting that the New Jersey Constitution requires
knowledge by the consenting party of his right to refuse authorization as a
prerequisite to a valid consent search); Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent
State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and FederalCourts, 63
TEx. L. REv. 977, 988 n.61 (1985) (stating that Article I, paragraph 7 of the New
Jersey Constitution requires that, before a consent search is considered valid, the
State must prove that the defendant knew of his right to refuse authorization).
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defendant's fianc6e, sought to justify a warrantless search of the
defendant's apartment that yielded illegal narcotics.2 0 The court first

determined that the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte" governed the defendant's federal claims
under the Fourth Amendment." Not ending its analysis there, the
New Jersey Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Sullivan, looked
to Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. Utilizing
this supplementary provision, the court determined that an essential
element of a valid waiver2 4 is personal knowledge of the right to
refuse authorization to a search. 25 This case provides an excellent
illustration that, as far back as twenty-five years ago, the New Jersey
Supreme Court was willing, through the state constitution, to
increase Fourth Amendment-type protections despite the United
States Supreme Court's narrowing interpretation in the area.
Four years after Johnson, in 1979, the United States Supreme
26 In Smith, the defendant claimed
Court decided Smith v. Maryland.
that the installation of a pen register2 7 on his telephone line was an
unconstitutional warrantless search.2 '
The Court rejected this
contention.2 In a majority opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court
declared that Smith had no legitimate expectation of privacy with
respect to the phone numbers he dialed, primarily because it is
See Johnson, 68 N.J. at 357, 346 A.2d at 70 (Pashman,J., dissenting).
412 U.S. 218 (1973). In Schneckloth, the United States Supreme Court held that
the government is not required to demonstrate the suspect's knowledge of his right
to refuse permission as a prerequisite to proving voluntary consent regarding the
underlying search. See id. at 248-49.
See Johnson,68 N.J. at 353, 346 A.2d at 67.
23 See id.
24 See Charles E. Moylan, Jr. & John Sonsteng, Fourth
Amendment Applicability, 16
WM. MITcHEL L. REv. 209, 244 (1990) (explaining that the key issue regarding
consensual searches is commonly the voluntariness of the authorization to conduct
the search).
25 See Johnson, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d
at 68.
26 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
In Smith, the Baltimore police, acting without a warrant,
20
2

requested that the phone company place a pen register on Smith's telephone after
the victim of a robbery identified Smith's vehicle and reported receiving threatening

phone calls from Smith. See id. at 737. Based partly on the information obtained
from the pen register, the police obtained a search warrant for Smith's residence,
and the subsequent inspection yielded incriminating evidence. See id. The victim
later identified Smith in a line-up. See id.

27 The Court defined a pen register as "'a mechanical
device that records the
numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when

the dial on the telephone is released."' Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting United States v. New
York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)).

28 See id. at 736.
29 See id. at 745-46.
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commonly known that the telephone company receives these
customer transmissions and uses them to establish monthly toll bills. 0
Faced with an almost identical set of facts, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in State v. Hunt,3' again relied on the New Jersey
Constitution to afford protections not established by the United
States Supreme Court.2 After conceding that under the United
States Constitution persons do not have reasonable expectations of
privacy in their toll billing records,3 3 the court assessed the same
privacy interests under the New Jersey Constitution.3' The court
preliminarily noted that only sound policy reasons justify a state
court's departure from the United States Supreme Court's
See id. at 742. The Court relied on Katz v. United States, a lodestar for evaluating
whether a given form of governmental electric surveillance is a search under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 739 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
Katz historically has been understood as announcing a two-part test to determine
whether a search has occurred under the Fourth Amendment. See Leslie A. Maria,
Investigation and Police Practices- Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 86 GEO. L.J. 1187,
1188-89 (1998).
The first prong is whether the individual has a subjective
expectation of privacy in the area searched, and the second prong is whether the
individual's subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to
recognize as objectively reasonable. See id. The Smith Court ultimately decided that
Smith did not have a subjective or objective expectation of privacy in the phone
numbers that he dialed. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-46. For further review of the
application and principles of privacy protections concerning telecommunications,
see Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Lost? The Government Knows Where You Are:
Cellular Telephone Call Location Technology and the Expectation of Privacy, 10 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 103, 103-05 (1998) (discussing privacy concerns regarding a new Federal
Communications Commission regulation requiring cellular telephone companies to
develop technology capable of locating the origin of a cellular call within 125
meters); Basil W. Mangano, Note, The Communications Assistancefor Law Enforcement
Act and Protection of Cordless Telephone Communications: The Use of Technology as a Guide
to Privacy, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 99, 112-15 (1996) (discussing state court decisions
protecting users of cordless telephones).
3
91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982). Hunt involved a State Police investigation
into bookmaking and gambling activities. See id. at 340-42, 450 A-2d at 952-54.
Detectives used informant's tips, as well as the defendant's toll billing records
(provided by the telephone company) to obtain court permission to install a pen
register on the defendant's phone. See id Ultimately, through the use of the pen
register and court-approved wire taps, the police were able to obtain a search warrant
for Hunt's apartment and car, and the subsequent search uncovered gambling
paraphernalia. See id. at 342, 450 A.2d at 953-54. The trial court denied Hunt's
motion to suppress the evidence derived from the initial acquisition of his toll billing
records, including all evidence obtained from the pen register, wire taps, and
ensuing search of his apartment. See id. at 340, 342, 450 A.2d at 952-53, 954.
32 See id. at 348, 450 A.2d at 957.
The court apparently was influenced by
Professor LaFave's contention that individuals have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in telephone records. See id. at 348, 450 A.2d at 956-57 (citing 1 WAYNE
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 2.7, at 67-69 (Supp. 1982)).
3 See id. at 343-44, 450 A.2d at 954.
:4 See id. at 344-45, 450
A.2d at 955.
30
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interpretation of a similar constitutional provision, especially when
35
those provisions share a congruous history and purpose.
Notwithstanding this significant qualification, the court found that
the defendant's expectation of privacy in his toll billing records was

reasonable in light of New Jersey's long-standing policy of protecting
telephone communications. The court also relied on the fact that
dissemination of these records would disclose identities of people
and places called, revealing the most confidential details of an
individual's life. 7 Moreover, the court invoked Justice Brennan's
clarion call that state constitutions should serve "'as a second line of
source of supplemental rights
defense .. .and as an independent
38

unrecognized by federal law."'
The Hunt decision is better known, however, for Justice
Handler's concurring opinion, which articulated seven circumstances

in which state courts legitimately could amplify federal rights. 39 The

New Jersey Supreme Court, at least until recently, frequently has
rationalized its expansion of certain federal rights through the use of
these criteria.40 Justice Handler stated that the first circumstance in
which the court could amplify federal rights occurs when the textual
language of the New Jersey Constitution serves as a basis for
additional protections.4' In doing so, Justice Handler identified two
See id. at 345, 450 A.2d at 955.
See id. In making this determination, the court observed several pre-Katz New
Jersey cases that indicated New Jersey's commitment to privacy in
telecommunications. See id. The court specifically mentioned its prior holding in
Morss v. Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 363-64, 132 A.2d 1, 13 (1957), in which the court found
that the legislative intent in enacting a telecommunications statute was to establish a
public policy condemning the tapping of telephones as a method of achieving
detection of a crime, and In re Wire Communication, 76 N.J. 255, 268, 386 A.2d 1295,
tatutes that directly impinge on the individual's right to
1302 (1978), finding that "[s]
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into privacy should be construed
narrowly."
37 See Hunt, 91 N.J. at 347, 450 A.2d at 956. The court, nonetheless, ultimately
found the admission of the toll records to be harmless error and affirmed Hunt's
conviction. See id. at 350, 450 A.2d at 957-58.
38 Id. at 346, 450 A.2d at 955 (quoting William J. Brennan, The Interpretation of
State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324, 1367 (1982)).
39 See id. at 364-68, 450 A.2d at 965-67 (HandlerJ.,
concurring).
40 See supra note 2 (discussing the NewJersey Supreme Court's track record in the
expansion of federal rights via state constitutional rights). Not all commentators,
however, have endorsed state court divergence from federal precedent. See generally
Ronald Susswein, The PracticalEffect of the "New Federalism" on Police Conduct in New
Jersey, 7 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 859 (1997) (exposing difficulty in training police
officers in the constitutional limitations of search-and-seizure law due to uncertainty
as to whether the New Jersey Supreme Court will diverge from a holding of the
United States Supreme Court).
41 See Hunt, 91 N.J. at 364, 450 A.2d at 965 (Handler, J.,
concurring).
35
36
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scenarios in which a court could use the text of a state constitution to
expand federal rights.

2

When the text of a state constitution

unequivocally provides additional protections not specified under the
United States Constitution, a state court must afford such
protections.4 3 Likewise, a state court may afford extra protections
when a clause under a state constitution uses significantly different
wording than does its counterpart under the United States
Constitution, even though the intent of the two clauses is the same."
The second circumstance occurs, Justice Handler asserted, when
the legislative history of a particular clause justifies departure from
federal law even when the state and federal constitutional clauses are
substantially similar.4 5 Through an analysis of legislative purpose, a
court may gain useful insight into whether the legislature intended
that a clause provide additional protections or that a court should
read such a clause independent of federal law. 6
With respect to the third circumstance, Justice Handler
determined that preexisting state case law could serve as an adequate
basis for departing from federal precedent because state
jurisprudence may have addressed the same concerns long before
they became federal constitutional claims.4 ' Regarding the fourth
circumstance, the justice opined that structural differences between
the New Jersey and United States Constitutions may allow for a more
expansive reading of the state constitution.4 ' Fifth, Justice Handler
42

See id.

45 See id.

For example, Article VIII, section 4, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey
Constitution provides for the right to a thorough and efficient education, whereas
the United States Constitution has no such provision. See id.
44 See id. at 364, 450 A.2d at 965 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Handler
additionally pointed out that the unique language of NewJersey's free speech clause
indicated that the clause should be read more broadly in scope than is the First
Amendment. See id. (citing State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 557, 423 A.2d 615, 626
(1980)). The justice also stated that the right to choose to have an abortion is
afforded enhanced protections under the equal protection clause of the state
constitution. See id. (referencing Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 302-04, 450
A.2d 925, 933 (1982)).
45 See id. at 365, 450 A.2d at 965 (Handler,
J., concurring).
4 See id.
47 See Hunt, 91 N.J. at 365, 450 A.2d at 965. Justice Handler posited that "[s]
tate
law is often responsive to concerns long before they are addressed by constitutional
claims." Id. (citing A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day
of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 874-77, 910-11 (1976)).
See id. at 365-66, 450 A.2d at 965-66 (Handler, J., concurring). By way of
illustration, the "United States Constitution is a grant of enumerated powers to the
federal government[J" while the New Jersey Constitution "serves only to limit
sovereign power which inheres directly in the people and indirectly in their elected
representatives." Id. at 365, 450 A.2d at 966 (Handler,J., concurring).
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announced that a state court could diverge from federal
interpretation when addressing matters of particular state interest or
local concern. 49 Such divergence is most appropriate when the
disputed issues do not require uniform national policy or when such
issues have significance only within state boundaries.) The sixth
circumstance, the justice suggested, is that state traditions could serve
as an additional criterion for divergence.51 For instance, New Jersey
has a tradition of providing greater protections than those found
under the United States Constitution in the areas of free speech" and
effective assistance of counsel in criminal trials. 53 Announcing the
seventh and final circumstance, Justice Handler proffered that public
attitudes of the New Jersey citizenry could afford a foundation for
deviation. While recognizing that NewJersey courts had yet to apply
this criterion, Justice Handler pointed to other state courts that had
resolved constitutional issues based upon the public attitudes of
citizens. 55 In sum, Justice Handler concluded that the use of these
See id. at 366, 450 A.2d at 966 (Handler,J., concurring).
See id.
See id. at 366-67, 450 A.2d at 966 (Handler,J., concurring).
52 See id. at 366-67, 450 A.2d at 966 (referencing
State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423
A.2d 615 (1980)).
Recently, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
determined that New Jersey's free speech clause is "no more restrictive than the
federal free speech clause...." Hamilton Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254,
264, 716 A.2d 1137, 1141-42 (1998). Consequently, the NewJersey Supreme Court
now "rel[ies] on federal constitutional principles in interpreting the free speech
clause of the New Jersey Constitution. Id., 716 A.2d at 1142. For further review of
commercial free speech protections in New Jersey, see generally Theresa A.
Marchitto, Note, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1037 (1999).
53 See Hunt, 91 N.J. at 366-67, 450 A.2d at 966. The justice observed
that the New
Jersey Supreme Court had expanded the effective assistance of counsel protections
created by the United States Constitution because of New Jersey's policy regarding
the role of attorneys in criminal trials. See id. (citing State v. Bellucci, 81 N.J. 531,
538, 410 A.2d 666, 669 (1980)).
See id. at 367, 450 A.2d at 966-67 (Handler,J., concurring).
55 See id. Justice Handler cited a Massachusetts case in
which the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the death penalty unconstitutional as cruel and
unusual punishment under the Massachusetts Constitution because the death
penalty is contrary to contemporary standards of decency in Massachusetts. See id.
(citing District Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass.
1980)). Justice Handler also cited to Alaska's broad privacy protections that resulted
from Alaskans' desire for individualistic lifestyles. See id. (citing Ravin v. State, 537
P.2d 494, 503-04 (Alaska 1975)). The Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Ravin
upheld the rights of Alaskan citizens to possess and consume marijuana in their
homes. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504. For an enlightening discussion regarding the
right of Alaskans to possess marjuana in their own homes for personal use, see
Andrew S. Winters, Ravin Revisited: Do Alaskans Still Have a Constitutional Right to
Possess Marijuana in the Privacy of Their Homes?, 15 ALAsKA L. REv. 315, 344 (1998)
(suggesting that the underlying privacy rationale in Ravin should still be embraced).
49

50
51
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seven criteria could justify a state court's independent resort to a state
constitution to expand individual rights.56
State v. Hempele57 is a landmark privacy decision that utilized
Justice Handler's criteria. In Hempele, decided in 1990, the New
Jersey Supreme Court considered the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Greenwood v. Calfornia.ss Hempele and Greenwood both
involved warrantless searches and seizures of curbside garbage, which
eventually yielded illegal narcotics.59 The United States Supreme
Court in Greenwood initially noted that the Fourth Amendment only
applies when a person has a subjective expectation of privacy that
society accepts as reasonable. 60 The Greenwood Court opined that the
defendant could not possibly have manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in his discarded curbside garbage because it
was accessible to third persons.6 ' The Court also articulated that,
even if the defendant had possessed a subjective expectation of
privacy in his discarded garbage, society was unwilling to recognize
that expectation as reasonable. The Court indicated, however, that
state courts were free to interpret their own constitutions as
See Hunt, 91 NJ. at 368, 450 A.2d at 967 (Handler, J., concurring). Implicitly
attempting to defend against assertions of naked judicial activism, Justice Handler
maintained that his criteria demonstrated that expansive interpretations of state
constitutions do "not spring from pure intuition but, rather, from a process that is
reasonable and reasoned." Id. at 367, 450 A.2d at 967 (Handler,J., concurring).
57 120 NJ. 182, 576 A.2d 793 (1990).
58 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
In Hempele, the police, acting without a warrant, seized and opened white
garbage bags from outside the defendants' home. See Hempele, 120 NJ. at 188-89, 576
A.2d at 796. The bags were found to contain trace amounts of marijuana, cocaine,
and methamphetamine, which led to the issuance of a search warrant and to
discovery of additional drugs and paraphernalia inside the defendants' home. See id.
Likewise, Greenwood also involved a warrantless search of garbage, which uncovered
illegal drugs and ultimately led to the issuance of a warrant for the search of
defendant's home. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37-38.
60 See Greenwood, 486 U.S.
at 39.
61 See id. at 40-41. The Court specifically opined that persons do not
have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their garbage because "plastic garbage bags left
on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." Id. at 40.
62 See id. at 41.
In rejecting the defendant's claims that an objective expectation
of privacy existed, the Court relied on the fact that several federal circuit courts and
state supreme courts also had reached the same conclusion. See id. at 41-43. Some
commentators believe that the United States Supreme Court's analysis is incorrect in
evaluating the reasonable expectation of privacy in one's abandoned personal trash.
See, e.g., Mary Elizabeth Minor, Note, Was the Right of Privacy Trashed in California v.
Greenwood?, 24 TuLSA L.J. 401, 427 (1989) (suggesting that, rather than have
established a bright-line rule, the United States Supreme Court should have adopted
a case-by-case approach to determining whether an individual manifests a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his discarded refuse).
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conferring greater protections than those offered by the Fourth
Amendment.5
In Hempele, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Clifford, preliminarily observed that warrantless searches of
curbside garbage are permissible under the United States
Constitution because of the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Greenwood.64 Justice Clifford then contemplated whether the New
Jersey Constitution offers any ancillary protections for persons who
have their discarded garbage subjected to state search and seizure.6
Relying on New Jersey's history of supplying state constitutional
protections to various types of personal containers,6 the court
explained that there is no difference between those containers
traditionally protected and opaque garbage bags. 67 Although garbage
bags placed outside for collection are indeed accessible to third
parties, the court calculated the true issue to be whether the
container has concealed its contents from public sight.64 The court
opined that a person has a privacy interest in an assorted variety of
personal containers, including opaque garbage bags containing
discarded materials. 69 In conclusion, the court held that an
individual does not relinquish this right as long as the container
shields its contents from plain view.7"
The NewJersey Supreme Court similarly diverged from a United
States Supreme Court holding in the context of searches of vehicles
after a lawful arrest of an occupant. In 1981, the United States
Supreme Court decided New York v. Belton. In Belton, a New York
state trooper, after stopping a vehicle for speeding, detected an odor
6

See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 43. While some state courts have taken the offer of

the United States Supreme Court and interpreted their own state constitutions to
find a reasonable expectation of privacy in abandoned rubbish, others have not.
Compare State v. Morris, 680 A.2d 90, 92 (Vt. 1996) (holding that, under the Vermont
Constitution, persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their forsaken
trash) with State v. Carriere, 545 N.W.2d 773, 776 (N.D. 1996) (finding that the
North Dakota Constitution offers no more protection than does the United States
Constitution with respect to privacy in discarded trash).
See Hempele, 120 N.J. at 195, 576 A.2d at 799.
65 See
id.
See id. at 202-03, 576 A.2d at 803.
67 See id. at 203, 576 A.2d
at 803.
68 See id., 576 A.2d at 804.
69 See id. at 225, 576
A.2d at 815.
70 See Hempele, 120 N.J. at 215, 576 A.2d at 810. The
court additionally rejected
the State's argument that, because garbage is pervasively regulated and is abandoned
at the curbside, no reasonable expectation of privacy attaches. See id. at 212, 576
A.2d at 808.
71 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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of marijuana emanating from inside the automobile and observed an
envelope marked "Supergold"7 2 on the floor of the car. 73 The trooper
then arrested the occupants of the vehicle and advised them of their
Mirandarights. 74 The trooper's subsequent search of the inside of the
vehicle uncovered cocaine in a zipped pocket of the defendant's
jacket, which was located in the backseat.75 The New York Court of
Appeals76 held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. 77 The
State appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court. Justice
Stewart, writing for the Court, explained that a police officer may,
incidental to a lawful custodial arrest of any passenger, conduct a
contemporaneous search of the passenger compartments of an
automobile.78 Extending this line of reasoning, the Court declared
that police officers additionally could search containers found within
the passenger compartments because these containers are also within
reach of the arrestee.79 The Court concluded that the search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because the police had lawfully
arrested the occupants and the searched jacket was within the
arrestee's immediate control. 80
The trooper correctly associated the word "Supergold" with marijuana. See id.
at 456.
72
73

See id. at 455-56.

See id. at 456. Miranda rights ensure that before any custodial interrogation, a
suspect must be made aware that he has the right to remain silent, that any answers
to questions asked may be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
speak with an attorney at any time, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will
be ?1rovided at no cost. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
See Belton, 453 U.S. at 456.
76 The Court of Appeals is the state of New York's highest tribunal.
The New
York Court of Appeals is the equivalent of the state supreme court in most other
states.
77 The New York Court of Appeals stated that "[a] warrantless
search of the
zippered pockets of an inaccessible jacket may not be upheld as a search incident to
a lawful arrest where there is no longer any danger that the arrestee or a confederate
might gain access to the article." People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 449 (1980). Two
judges dissented, pointing out that the "search was conducted by a lone peace officer
who was in the process of arresting four unknown individuals whom he had stopped
in a speeding car owned by none of them and apparently containing an uncertain
quantity of a controlled substance." Id. at 454 (Gabrielli,J., dissenting).
See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. In the motor vehicle context, once "an occupant...
is arrested, a limited search of the vehicle may [constitutionally] be conducted."
Kevin Corr, A Law Enforcement Primer on Vehicle Searches, 30 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 13
(1998).
79 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61.
8o See id. at 462-63; see also Thomas K. Clancy, Protective Searches, Pat-Downs, or
Frisks?: The Scope of the Permissible Intrusion to Ascertain ifa DetainedPerson is Armed, 82
MARQ. L. REv. 491, 528 (1999) (finding that Belton established a practical rule for
police officers involving automobile searches incident to arrest); Douglas M. Smith,
Comment, Ohio v. Robinette: Per Se Unreasonable, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 897, 942
74
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In 1994, the New Jersey Supreme Court, when faced with a
similar set of facts in State v. Pierce,8 rejected the Belton rule conceived
by the United States Supreme Court. 2 The court held that, under
Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, the Belton rule
is inapplicable to warrantless arrests made for motor vehicle
offenses.3 In rejecting Belton, the court referenced a long line of New
Jersey cases that reflected New Jersey's steadily evolving commitment
to providing enhanced search-and-seizure protections." The court
likewise rejected the rationale that the United States Supreme Court
endorsed in Chimel v. Califomia2 - that searches incident to the
(1998) (finding that the Supreme Court fashioned its bright-line rule in Belton in
light of the perceived inability of lower courts to properly apply the search-incidentto-arrest doctrine in the context of motor vehicles).
81 136 N.J. 184, 642 A.2d 947 (1994). Pierce was a passenger in a van that police
had stopped for speeding. See id. at 186-87, 642 A.2d at 948. The police arrested the
driver of the van for driving with a suspended license and secured him in a patrol
car. See id. at 187, 642 A.2d at 948. Pierce and the other passenger were ordered out
of the van and secured behind the vehicle. See id. The officer then conducted a
search of the inside of the van that uncovered trace amounts of cocaine in a jacket
belonging to Pierce. See id. The officer also discovered a large hunting knife and a
revolver with four rounds of.357 magnum ammunition, two of which were spent. See
id.
82 Several other state courts also have rejected the logic
of the United States
Supreme Court in Belton by invoking their state constitutions. See State v. Hernandez,
410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982) (holding that, under Louisiana law, the Belton rule
does not govern police conduct); Commonwealth v. Toole, 448 N.E.2d 1264, 1267
(Mass. 1983) (finding the search of the cab of a tractor trailer to be unconstitutional
when the police had already removed and handcuffed the driver); State v. Gilberts,
497 N.W.2d 93, 97 (N.D. 1993) (determining that the arrest of a vehicle's driver is
insufficient tojustify a police search of a passenger's coat); State v. Kirsch, 686 P.2d
446, 448 (Or. 1984) (exclaiming that "Belton is not the law of Oregon"); State v.
Stroud, 720 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Wash. 1986) (suggesting that Washington courts apply
a balancing test approach rather than the bright-line rule of Belton); see also Jon F.
Sheehan, Comment, State v. Pierce: State Constitutional Protection Against the Belton
Search Incident to Arrest Rule, 30 NEW ENG. L. REv. 843, 882 (1996) (finding that the
New Jersey Supreme Court wisely rejected the United States Supreme Court's Belton
rule by looking to the court's own state constitution as well as holdings of other state
supreme courts).
83 See Pierce, 136 N.J. at 208, 642 A.2d at 959.
84 See id. at 209, 642 A.2d at 960. The court referenced State v. Hempele, 120 N.J.
182, 225, 576 A.2d 793, 815 (1990) (holding that warrantless searches of garbage are
unconstitutional under the state constitution); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 15657, 519 A.2d 820, 857-58 (1987) (rejecting the good faith exception to the federal
exclusionary rule); State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 347, 450 A.2d 952, 956 (1982) (holding
that the New Jersey Constitution offers privacy protections to telephone callers and
the numbers they dial); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 227, 440 A.2d 1311, 1319 (1981)
(finding that a property interest suffices to confer standing to challenge an
automobile search).
85 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). Specifically, in Chime4 the United States Supreme
Court held that an arresting officer may search the arrestee and the surrounding
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arrests of motor vehicle occupants are necessary to identify and
secure any weapons or contraband 6 The NewJersey Supreme Court,
however, limited its holding to arrests for motor vehicle offenses. 7
Nonetheless, State v. Pierce provides a worthy illustration of how the
New Jersey Supreme Court has used Article I, paragraph 7 to
enhance search-and-seizure protections not available under the
Fourth Amendment.
II. THE END OF AN ERA?
In the transitional court term of 1997-98, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, now including two of Governor Whitman's
appointments (including Chief Justice Poritz), appeared to rein in
the previous expansive protections afforded under Article 1,
paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution.88 In New Jersey Transit
PBA Local 304 v. New Jersey Transit Corp.,"9 Chief Justice Poritz
authored a unanimous opinion in which the court held that New
Jersey Transit could randomly test its police officers for drugs without
violating the state constitution. 90 In so doing, the court overruled the
New Jersey appellate division's 1987 holding in Fraternal Order of
Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark)" In that case, the court
held that drug testing of police officers without probable cause or
individualized suspicion violates the NewJersey Constitution. 92
area to remove weapons that the arrestee might use to effect escape or resist arrest,
and to locate pertinent evidence and prevent its concealment or destruction. See id.
86 See Pierce, 136 N.J. at 210, 642 A.2d at 960.
The New Jersey Supreme Court
maintained that the need for this type of search diminishes drastically when the
police effect a routine motor vehicle arrest rather than a criminal arrest. See id.
87 See id. at 208, 642 A.2d at 959.
88 See NewJersey Transit PBA Local 304 v. NewJersey Transit Corp., 151
N.J. 531,
564-65, 701 A.2d 1243, 1259-60 (1997) (holding that random suspicionless drug
testing of New Jersey Transit police officers does not violate the officers' reasonable
expectation of privacy under the state constitution); State ex rel. J.G., N.S. and J.T.,
151 N.J. 565, 594, 701 A.2d 1260, 1274-75 (1997) (upholding a New Jersey statute
that compels HIV testing of accused and convicted sex offenders provided that
probable cause of a risk of transmission is shown).
89 151 N.J. 531, 701
A.2d 1243 (1997).
90 See New jersey TransitPBA, 151 N.J. at 564-65, 701 A.2d
at 1259-60.
91216 N.J. Super. 461, 524 A.2d 430 (App.Div. 1987). The appellate division
wrote, "[w]hile we like to believe that the United States Supreme Court would reach
the same result as a matter of federal constitutional law, we offer no such
prediction." Id. at 477, 524 A.2d at 438. Ironically, two years later, the United States
Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion with respect to the same issue. See
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (holding
that mandatory drug testing of certain federal employees is permissible, even without
susicion, ifjustified by compelling governmental interests).
See New Jersey Transit PBA, 151 N.J. at 558, 701 A.2d at 1256. The court held

376

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:361

In order to maintain its eligibility for federal funding, 93 New
Jersey Transit instituted a policy that subjected transit police officers
to mandatory random drug testing.M9 In April of 1995, the NewJersey
Transit Police Benevolent Association (PBA) filed a complaint,
alleging that New Jersey Transit's random drug and alcohol testing
policy violated the New Jersey Constitution, namely, Article I,
paragraph 7.95 The trial court and the appellate division both upheld
the policy. 96 The unanimous appellate division 97 applied the special
needs balancing test 8 that the United States Supreme Court

that "[c]ases decided since FOP [Fraternal Order of Police] call into question the
continued validity of its holding. To the extent that FOP is inconsistent with the
special needs test we adopt today, it is overruled." Id. The court discounted Justice
Handler's suggestion in Hunt that, in determining whether the New Jersey
Constitution should afford additional protections, the court should evaluate New
Jersey's preexisting state law and traditions. See Hunt, 91 N.J. at 365-67, 450 A.2d at
956-66 (Handler, J., concurring). Nonetheless, the New Jersey TransitPBA court did
recognize that "we have, in certain circumstances, found that Article I, paragraph 7
affords greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than does the
Federal Constitution." See New Jersey TransitPBA, 151 N.J. at 556, 701 A.2d at 1255.
93 In 1991, Congress enacted legislation that conditioned state receipt
of federal
transportation funds upon state implementation of a program of drug and alcohol
testing of transportation industry employees working in safety-sensitive positions. See
id. at 536, 701 A.2d at 1245. Employees who carry a firearm for security purposes are
on the list of employees who perform safety-sensitive functions. See id. at 537, 701
A.2d at 1246 (citing 49 C.F.R. §§ 653.7, 654.7 (1999)).
Through its enabling
legislation, the NewJersey Transit Corporation is authorized to "'comply with federal
statutes, rules and regulations, and qualify for and receive all forms of financial
assistance available under federal law."' Id. at 535, 701 A.2d at 1245 (quoting N.J.
7
STAT. ANN. § 2 :25-5(g) (West 1998)). New Jersey Transit established an internal
police department to provide security protection for all locations and agency
services. See id. Transit police officers are members of the state police force and
have general authority to exercise police duties and powers, including carrying
firearms and, in particular circumstances, the use of deadly force. See id. at 535-36,
701 A.2d at 1245.
94 See id. at 538, 701 A.2d at 1246. Any state failing to institute such a
program
would be ineligible to receive federal transportation funds. See id. at 536, 701 A.2d at
1245 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 5331 (g) (1998)).
95 See id. at 541, 701 A.2d at
1248.
96 See id. at 541-42, 701 A.2d at 1248.
97 See id. at 542, 701 A.2d at 1248. The appellate division also rejected
the logic
that the court employed in Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of
Newark, 216 N.J. Super. 461, 534 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1987), in which the court held
that random drug testing of police officers violated Article I, paragraph 7 of the New
Jersey Constitution because police officers are not part of a highly regulated industry.
See id.
98 Although "[n]o clear test defines the 'special needs' exception
...an analysis
of the Supreme Court cases reveals that four themes are discernible, although often
difficult to apply: (1) the search facilitates the administrative operation of the
agency; (2) the officials conducting the search lack the training to be able to
determine probable cause; (3) the object of the search has a diminished privacy
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articulated in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n" and National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.'O'
expectation; and (4) the circumstances surrounding the search create enhanced
governmental interests." Michael S. Vaughn & Rolando V. del Carmen, "Special
Needs" in CriminalJustice: An Evolving Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant and
Probable Cause Requirements, 3 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 203, 216 (1993). The
special needs balancing test also has been the subject of much criticism. See, e.g., Neil
Floyd, Searches in the Absence of Individualized Suspicion: The Case of Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton, 50 ARK. L. REV. 335, 341 (1997). Floyd writes, "[o]nly in those
exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the need of law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable, is
the [C]ourt entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers."
Id. The United States Supreme Court, on several occasions, has employed the
special needs balancing test. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997)
(holding that a state requirement that candidates for public office submit to a drug
test was a constitutionally invalid suspicionless search); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661-65 (1995) (permitting random drug testing of student
athletes when a substantial record of drug use existed within the student athlete
population); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989)
(holding that "in limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the
search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the
intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individual suspicion, a
search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion"); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 (1989) (upholding a policy of
random drug testing of customs employees who carry a firearm or participate in drug
interdiction because of the unique mission of the agency).
99 489 U.S. 602 (1989). In Skinner, the United States Supreme
Court held that
"post-accident drug testing of railroad employees.., does not violate constitutionally
guaranteed protections." Susan Haberberger, Comment, Reasonable Searches Absent
Individualized Suspicion: Is There a Drug-Testing Exception to the Fourth Amendment
Warrant Requirement After Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association , 12 U.
HAw. L. REV. 343, 345-46 (1990); see also Loree L. French, Note, Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Association and the Fourth Amendment Warrant-Probable Cause
Requirement: Special Needs Exception Creating a Shakedown Inspection?, 40 CATH. U. L.
REV. 117, 152-53 (1990) (finding that the Skinner decision addressed the current
national concern with illegal drug use by sanctioning random suspicionless drug
tests). But see Sherri Ann Carver, Comment, The Battle of the Balancing Tests in the
Fourth Amendment Drug Testing Cases: Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association - The Proper Balance Is Struck, 15 OKLA. CiTY U. L. REV. 333, 358 (1990)
(concluding that "[tlhe Supreme Court has equitably balanced individual privacy
rights, employers' rights, and the public interest" through application of the special
needs balancing test).
100 489 U.S. 656 (1989). In Von Raab, the Supreme Court determined "that
mandatory drug testing of federal employees is permissible, even without suspicion,
ifjustified by compelling governmental interests." Alyssa C. Westover, Note, National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab - Will the War Against Drugs Abrogate
Constitutional Guarantees, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 793, 793-94 (1990); see also Harlin Ray
Dean, Jr., Note, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab: The Fourth
Amendment Hangs in the Balance, 68 N.C. L. REV. 389, 409 (1990) (contending that the
United States Supreme Court "eliminated, for the convenience of government, the
safeguards surrounding the Fourth Amendment that were meant to limit the
government and to protect individual privacy and freedom"); Jeannette C. James,
Comment, The Constitutionality of Federal Employee Drug Testing: National Treasury
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The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and
affirmed the appellate division's judgment.' ' Chief Justice Poritz
began the analysis by recognizing that a mandatory drug test is a
search under both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions.' 2
While stating that searches conducted without a warrant are generally
per se unreasonable, Chief Justice Poritz noted certain exceptions to
the warrant requirement.0 3
The court further observed that
individuals involved in pervasively regulated industries that have a
history of close governmental supervision have a reduced expectation
of privacy °4 The court additionally noted the lack of judicial
consensus as to whether police are included within this category, and
thus determined that the issue could not be resolved under that logic
alone. 105

The court restated with approval the framework under which the
United States Supreme Court had examined suspicionless drug
testing under the special needs doctrine.' 6 Chief Justice Poritz
concluded that the special needs test is equally applicable in the
current case regarding the court's analysis under the New Jersey
Constitution. ° Just as the United States Supreme Court had not
made application of the special needs balancing test contingent upon
a demonstrated drug problem, Chief Justice Poritz also invoked the
special needs doctrine even though New Jersey Transit had adduced
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 109, 137 (1988) (recommending
that the reasonable-suspicion standard should be the criterion by which to judge the
constitutionality of drug-testing schemes).
101 See New Jersey TransitPBA, 151 N.J. at 535, 701 A.2d at 1245.
102 See id. at 543, 701 A.2d at 1249. The court
again referenced Skinner and Von
Raab for the proposition that government-compelled drug testing is a search and is
subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See id. The court also noted
a prior NewJersey case that also found that mandatory drug testing is a search. See
id. (citing O'Keefe v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n, 132 N.J. 234, 242, 624 A.2d 578,
582 (1993)).
1o3 See id. at 543-44, 701 A.2d at 1249.
104 See id. at 545, 701 A.2d
at 1250.
105 See id. at 546, 701 A.2d at 1250. Compare
Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n of N.J.,
Local 318 v. Township of Wash., 850 F.2d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding, based on
statutes and regulations governing police work, that police officers are members of a
heavily regulated industry) with FraternalOrder of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12, 216 N.J.
Super. at 469, 524 A.2d at 434 (finding that police officers are not members of a
highly regulated industry even though police are subject to numerous administrative
and statutory controls). The New York Court of Appeals has held that certain police
officers are within the "highly regulated" exception. See In re Caruso v. Ward, 72
N.Y.2d 432, 442 (1988) (upholding random drug testing for police officers involved
with the elite crime unit based on a reduced expectation of privacy).
106 See NewJersey TransitPBA, 151 N.J. at
547-48, 701 A.2d at 1251.
107 See id. at 556, 701 A.2d at 1255.
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no evidence of a drug problem among its transit officers.0 8
Moreover, the court illustrated that many courts in post-Skinner/Von
Raab decisions under the United States Constitution, as well as other
state charters, have held that random testing of armed police officers
is permissible.'09
With the special needs balancing test now articulated, the court
evaluated the drug-testing program under that framework.1 0 The
court first evaluated the governmental need to conduct such
suspicionless searches."'
Chief Justice Poritz found that special
governmental needs did exist because transit officers perform safetysensitive functions, and impaired officers may cause severe harm
before their impairments give rise to individualized suspicion."2
Furthermore, the court found justification for suspicionless searches
because New Jersey Transit proposed the program as a public safety
measure and not as a law enforcement mechanism."" In comparing
the public and private interests advanced, the court acknowledged
that, while urine testing is an invasion of an individual's privacy, New
Jersey Transit designed the testing procedures to minimize that

108 See id. ChiefJustice Poritz obeyed the recommendation of the Von
Raab Court,
which stated that a demonstrated drug abuse problem is not necessary in all cases.
See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674-75. Additionally, ChiefJustice Poritz endorsed the logic
thatJustice Ginsburg employed in her explanation of the Von Raab decision. See New
Jersey TransitPBA, 151 N.J. at 556-57, 701 A.2d at 1255-56 (citing Chandler,520 U.S. at
321). In Chandler, Justice Ginsburg explained that in Von Raab a demonstrated drug
problem was not necessary because (1) customs officers are regularly engaged in the
investigation of criminals who deal in immense quantities of narcotics and (2)
customs officers perform many of their duties outside of the public eye. See Chandler,
520 U.S. at 321. Endorsement of this logic by Chief Justice Poritz seems erroneous
inasmuch as transit police officers are not involved regularly with narcotics
investigations and carry out their duties almost entirely within the public eye.
109 See New Jersey Transit PBA, 151 N.J. at 555, 701 A.2d at 1254-55.
The court
referred to several cases, including National Federation of Federal Employees v. Cheney,
884 F.2d 603, 612-13 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding the Army's random testing of
armed guards); Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557, 1558 (1st Cir. 1989) (approving
random drug testing of armed police officers because they participate in drug
interdiction); and McCloskey v. Honolulu Police Department, 799 P.2d 953, 958-59 (Haw.
1990) (holding that the Honolulu Police Department's drug testing requirement is
not more intrusive than needed because of the officer's lowered privacy
expectations). The court, however, noted one case in which a court declared a
random drug testing scheme unconstitutional. See Guiney v. Police Comm'r of
Boston, 582 N.E.2d 523, 526 (Mass. 1991) (invalidating random drug testing of
police officers under the Massachusetts Constitution).
...See New Jersey Transit PBA, 151 N.J. at 558-59, 701 A.2d at 1256-57.
"'

See id.

See id. at 559, 701 A.2d at 1257.
1s See id.
11
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The court instructed that police officers have a
intrusion.'
diminished expectation of privacy given the nature and extent of
police duties and functions." 5 ChiefJustice Poritz then declared that
requiring individualized suspicion would compromise New Jersey
Transit's safety objectives." 6 Ultimately, the court upheld the New

Jersey Transit testing policy, finding dispositive similarities between
the random, suspicionless drug testing of transit police officers and
the testing of armed customs officers that the United 7States Supreme
Court found constitutionally permissible in Von Raab.1
In further evaluation of state constitutional privacy protections,
the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an opinion in State ex rel. J.G.,
N.S. andj T."' on the same day as New Jersey Transit PBA Local 304."9
In J. G., another unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Poritz,
the court again applied the special needs balancing test as the court
upheld judicially ordered Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
testing for accused or convicted sex offenders. 2 0 The court found
114

See id. at 559-61, 701 A.2d at 1257-58. The policy states that only a certified

laboratory conducts the testing after a member of the same sex observes the private
collection of urine samples. See id. at 539, 701 A.2d at 1247. The samples then are
analyzed carefully for the presence of certain illegal drugs. See id. If the urine tests
positive for the presence of illegal drugs, the police officer may, within 72 hours,
have a split sample tested by a different certified laboratory. See id. at 539-40, 701
A.2d at 1247. A Medical Review Officer employed by New Jersey Transit, after
meeting with the employee, must confirm that the positive result has a legitimate
medical explanation. See id. at 540, 701 A.2d at 1247. If the results are deemed
positive, the Medical Review Officer reports these results to the appropriate New
Jersey Transit official, and the officer is dismissed. See id. at 540-41, 701 A.2d at 124748.
15 See id. at 561-62, 701 A.2d at 1258. The court maintained that transit officers'
split-second judgment is critical, especially in situations that call for them to draw
their weapons. See id. at 562, 701 A.2d at 1258. Given this need, the court concluded
that transit officers must anticipate an examination into their fitness and probity and,
therefore, have a lower expectation of privacy. See id. (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at

672).
16
117

See New Jersey TransitPBA, 151 N.J. at 564, 701 A.2d at 1259.
See id. at 564-65, 701 A.2d at 1259-60 (reinforcing that the United States

Supreme Court's holding in Von Raab now is binding in NewJersey courts).
8 151 N.J. 565, 701 A.2d 1260 (1997).
119 The New Jersey Supreme Court issued opinions in New Jersey Transit PBA and
JG. on the same day, September 25, 1997. In an interesting parallel fashion, the
United States Supreme Court, in Skinner and Von Raab, had issued its own landmark
opinions with respect to the special needs balancing test on a single day, March 21,
1989.
120 SeeJ.G., 151 N.J. at 594, 701 A.2d at 1274-75.
The court qualified its conclusion
by holding that "before testing may be ordered, a court must find probable cause to
believe that the victim has been exposed to a risk that transmission of the AIDS virus
may have occurred." Id. For further commentary regarding court-ordered HIV
testing, see Justin P. Runke, Note, Fourth Amendment Balancing Test: Special Needs of
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that the New Jersey statutory testing scheme2 was constitutional
under both 2the
United States Constitution and the New Jersey
2
Constitution.
Rape Victims Justify Court-Ordered HIV Testing of the Accused, 29 SETON HALL L. REV.
1094, 1121 (1999) (arguing that a rape victim is entitled to information regarding
her attacker's HIV status even at the expense of the defendant's privacy); see also
Justin Amaechi Okezie, The Presumption of Guilt and Compulsory HIV Testing of Accused
Sex Offenders: A Case Study of State ex rel. J.G., N.S. and J.T., 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L.
557, 577-78 (1998) (maintaining that the NewJersey Supreme Court misapplied the
special needs doctrine in holding the HIV-testing statute constitutional).
121 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-2.2 (West 1995). The statute provides in
relevant
part:
a. In addition to any other disposition made pursuant to law, a court
shall order a person convicted of, indicted for or formally charged
with, or ajuvenile charged with delinquency or adjudicated delinquent
for an act which if committed by an adult would constitute, aggravated
sexual assault or sexual assault as defined in subsection a. or c. of N.J.S.
2C:14-2 to submit to an approved serological test for acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or infection with the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or any other related virus identified as a
probable causative agent of AIDS. The court shall issue such an order
only upon the request of the victim and upon application of the
prosecutor made at the time of indictment, charge, conviction or
adjudication of delinquency. The person or juvenile shall be ordered
by the court to submit to such repeat or confirmatory tests as may be
medically necessary.
As used in this section, "formal charge" includes a proceeding by
accusation in the event that the defendant has waived the right to an
indictment.
b. A court order issued pursuant to subsection a. of this section shall
require testing to be performed as soon as practicable by the
Commissioner of the Department of Corrections pursuant to authority
granted to the Commissioner by sections 6 and 10 of P.L.1976, c.98
(C.30:1B-6 and 30:1B-10), by a provider of health care, at a health
facility licensed pursuant to section 12 of P.L.1971, c.136 (C.26:2H-12)
or the Juvenile Justice Commission established pursuant to section 2 of
P.L.1995, c.284 (C.52:17B-170). The order shall also require that the
results of the test be reported to the offender and to the appropriate
Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy ....
e. Upon receipt of the result of a test ordered pursuant to subsection
a. of this section, the Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy shall provide
the victim with appropriate counseling, referral for counseling and if
appropriate, referral for health care. The office shall notify the victim
or make appropriate arrangements for the victim to be notified of the
test result.
f. The result of a test ordered pursuant to subsection a. of this section
shall be confidential and employees of the Department of Corrections,
the Juvenile Justice Commission, the Office of Victim-Witness
Advocacy, a health care provider, health care facility or counseling
service shall not disclose the result of a test performed pursuant to this
section except as authorized herein or as otherwise authorized by law
or court order. The provisions of this section shall not be deemed to
prohibit disclosure of a test result to the person tested.
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In 1995,J.G., N.S., andJ.T.121 plead guilty to delinquency charges
24
for forcibly sodomizing a ten-year-old mentally retarded female.
The State, at the victim's request, subsequently moved to compel the
juveniles to submit to statutory HIV testing. 25 The juveniles objected,
claiming that the statute violates both the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution
and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New
26
Jersey Constitution.
Analyzing this contention, Chief Justice Poritz instructed that,
under the special needs doctrine established by the United States
Id.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4A-43.1 specifically provides:
In accordance with section 4 of P.L.1993, c.364 (C.2C:43-2.2) and in
addition to any other disposition authorized pursuant to N.J.S. 2AAA43, a court shall order a juvenile charged with delinquency or
adjudicated delinquent for an act which if committed by an adult
would constitute aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault as defined
in subsection a. or c. of N.J.S. 2C:14-2 to submit to an approved
serological test for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or
infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or any other
related virus identified as a probable causative agent of AIDS.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A4A-43.1 (West 1995).
1
SeeJ.G., 151 N.J. at 570, 701 A.2d at 1262. ChiefJustice Poritz wrote: "We hold
that the challenged statutes do not impinge on an offender's federal or state
constitutional rights provided that, before a court orders testing, it finds probable
cause to believe that the accused or convicted sex offender has exposed the victim to
a risk of possible HIV transmission." Id.
123 J.G., N.S., and J.T., all minors, were thirteen, fourteen,
and fifteen years old,
respectively, when the incident occurred. See id. at 571, 701 A.2d at 1263.
4 See id.
125 See id.
126 See id.
The juveniles also maintained that the statute violated their rights
under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution because the
statute provides insufficient procedural safeguards in preserving the privacy rights of
accused, but not yet convicted, individuals. See id.at 571-72, 701 A.2d at 1263. The
chancery division heard testimonial evidence from three experts on behalf of the
juveniles regarding available HIV-testing methodologies, medical treatment, and
psychological counseling after a risk of exposure to the HIV virus. See id. at 572, 701
A.2d at 1263. The chancery division applied the special needs balancing test and
concluded that, although the State has a legitimate and compelling interest in
protecting victims of sexual assault, the challenged statutes provided no such benefit
to the victim. See id. Thus, the chancery division held that the statutes are
unconstitutional under the United States Constitution. See id. The appellate division
reversed and remanded for entry of an order compelling the juveniles to comply
with the HIV testing. See id. at 574-75, 701 A.2d at 1264-65. The appellate division
specifically wrote, "[w]hen balanced, the individual defendant's interest in
preventing a bodily intrusion and disclosure of his HIV status is significantly less
weighty than the compelling state interest in the health and welfare of the victim in
particular and the public in general." State ex rel. J.G., N.S. andJ.T., 289 N.J. Super.
575, 592, 701 A.2d 625, 633 (App. Div. 1996).
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Supreme Court, the encroachment upon individual rights must be
balanced against the interests that the State seeks to promote. 7
Chief Justice Poritz surmised that states may constitutionally dispense
with the individualized suspicion requirement when special needs are
attendant.28 Further, the court imparted that federal precedent
requires it to use a special needs analysis to determine whether the
HIV testing statute violates either the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution or Article I, paragraph 7 of the NewJersey
Constitution."
Performing the special needs analysis, the chief justice
announced that if the court were to require individualized suspicion
before sanctioning H1V testing, the state objectives would be
frustrated."" In particular, the court stressed that HIV symptoms are
latent."' Chief Justice Poritz next addressed the individual privacy
interests implicated by statutory HIV testing.'32 The court determined
that any disclosure concerning positive test results significantly
invades privacy, although drawing of blood is a minimally intrusive
medical procedure. 33 The court then balanced the privacy interests
127
128

SeeJ.G., 151 N.J. at 576, 701 A.2d at 1265.
See id. at 577, 701 A.2d at 1265-66. The court essentially relied on Skinner in

reaching this conclusion. See id. Chief Justice Poritz observed that several lower
federal courts, in addition to the United States Supreme Court, have upheld the state
interests in conducting suspicionless bodily searches. See id. at 577-78, 701 A.2d at
1266. The court specifically cited Chandler,520 U.S. at 1304-05 (applying the special
needs test to invalidate a state statute requiring that candidates for public office
submit to drug testing); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-64 (applying the special needs test
to school-conducted drug testing of student athletes); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668-75
(applying the special needs test in drug testing of Customs Service employees); Stigile
v. Clinton, 110 F.3d 801, 803-04 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (applying the special needs test to
drug testing of Office of Management and Budget employees who had access to areas
frequented by the President and Vice President); Tanks v. Greater Cleveland Regional
TransitAuthority, 930 F.2d 475, 479-81 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying the special needs test
in drug testing of bus drivers after minor accidents); Transportation Workers' Union of
Philadelphia, Local 234 v. Southeastern Pennsylvania TransportationAuthority, 884 F.2d
709, 711-12 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying the special needs test in drug testing of certain
transit workers).
19 SeeJG., 151 N.J. at 578, 701 A.2d at 1266. ChiefJustice
Poritz cited New Jersey
TransitPBA for the proposition that NewJersey courts should apply the special needs
test. See id. In New Jersey Transit PBA, Chief Justice Poritz wrote: "We find that the
special needs test provides a useful analytical framework for considering the
protections afforded by Article I, paragraph seven of the NewJersey Constitution and
adopted this approach in our review.. . ." New Jersey Transit PBA, 151 N.J. at 556, 701
A.2d at 1255.
l SeeJG., 151 N.J. at 579, 701 A.2d at 1267.
31

See id.

See id. at 580, 701 A.2d at 1267.
See id. Scholars dispute this contention that drawing of blood is not intrusive.
See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and
132
135
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'
of the juveniles against the state interest in HIV testing. 3
Discounting the testimony of the juveniles' experts, the court deemed
the state interest "unquestionably compelling" because the testing
furthers the victim's right to obtain crucial medical information
relating to her attacker's H1V status-.5 5 The court held that the
statute's procedural safeguards minimize the invasion of privacy
inherent in the disclosure of positive test results. 36 While endorsing
these procedural protections, the court itself added an auxiliary
safeguard requiring the State to demonstrate probable cause to
believe that the offense involved a transfer of bodily fluids.' 7 After

What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REv. 173, 243 n.344 (1999) (finding that
the drawing of blood ranks among the most intrusive of searches).
1% See id.at 581, 701 A.2d at 1267. The court announced that the state interest
.must be substantial . . . [and] important enough to override the individual's
acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's
normal requirement of individualized suspicion." Id. (quoting Chandler,520 U.S. at
1306).
135Seef.G., 151 N.J. at 581, 701 A.2d at 1267-68. The court reached this opinion in
part because the victim of a sexual assault may make informed choices regarding her
physical and mental well-being when she has knowledge of the attacker's HIV status.
See id. In dismissing the testimony of the juveniles' experts, the court concluded,
"Clearly, a diversity of views exists within the medical community. Also.... our
knowledge about AIDS treatment and diagnosis is constantly evolving." Id. at 587,
701 A.2d at 1271.
M See id. at 587-88, 701 A.2d at 1271. The court observed that the juveniles'
privacy interests were not excessively infringed upon, considering that the test results
could not be used in a criminal prosecution, the testing could be requested only by
the victim of the assault, and the test results could be disclosed only to the victim, the
assailant, and the Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy, which may only disclose further
upon a court order. See id. at 587, 701 A.2d at 1271. The court further articulated
that federal guidelines regarding H1V testing serve as a useful guidepost in
interpreting the NewJersey statute. See id. The federal guidelines state: "The victim
may disclose the test results only to any medical professional, counselor, family
member or sexual partner(s) the victim may have had since the attack. Any such
individual to whom the test results are disclosed by the victim shall maintain the
confidentiality of such information." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 14011 (b) (5)).
137 The court appeared to attach this extra safeguard
in response to the broad
range of sexual acts covered under the statutory definition of penetration. SeefJG.,
151 N.J. at 589, 701 A.2d at 1272. Acts classified as penetration and, therefore,
triggering the New Jersey HLV testing statute, include "vaginal intercourse,
cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse between persons or the insertion of the
hand, finger or object into the anus or vagina either by the actor or upon the actor's
instruction." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1 (c) (West 1995). The court likewise noted that
several states and the federal government also require, before testing is permitted, a
showing of risk that HIV was transmitted. SeeJG., 151 N.J. at 590-91, 701 A.2d at
1272 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 14011(b) (2) (C) (1988); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1415(B)
(West 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.003(2) (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. 17-10-15
(1997); IDAHO CODE § 121055 (1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-10.5(a)(1) (West
1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709B.2 (West 1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2290(1) (1996);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534.3 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07.7-01 (1995); WIsc.
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dispensing with the juveniles' due-process claims,"" Chief Justice
Poritz deemed the New Jersey HIV-testing statute constitutional
under both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey
Constitution."'
During the 1998-1999 term, the New Jersey Supreme Court
unanimously' 40 issued a ruling in State v. Donis'4 ' that illustrates the
further erosion of privacy protections under the state constitution.
The court held that police officers are permitted to use a mobile data
terminal (MDT)' 42 to randomly access certain motorist43 information
without first witnessing a violation of motor vehicle law.1
§ 968.38 (West 1998)).
I" The court found that "[a]s to the juveniles' claim that the testing statutes lack
safeguards to protect the privacy and liberty interests of accused sex offenders, we
also find no due process violation."JG., 151 N.J. at 593, 701 A.2d at 1274.
139
See id. at 594, 701 A.2d at 1274-75. The chiefjustice wrote: "Thejudgment of
the Appellate Division is affirmed insofar as it sustained the constitutionality of the
testing statutes as applied to juveniles. The judgment is modified insofar as we
require that, before testing may be ordered, a court must find probable cause to
believe that the victim has been exposed to a risk that transmission of the AIDS virus
may have occurred." Id.
140 Justice Stein argued that the majority should
have held "unconditionally that
random use of mobile data terminals (MDTs) by police officers to obtain motorists'
personal information is impermissible conduct." State v. Donis, 157 N.J. 44, 59, 723
A.2d 35, 42 (1998) (Stein,J., concurring).
:41
157 N.J. 44, 723 A.2d 35 (1998).
42 MDTs, linked to the database at the NewJersey Division of Motor
Vehicles, are
on-board computers that appear inside police vehicles. MDTs can, upon the officer
inputting a license plate number, disseminate information, including the expiration
date of the vehicle's registration, whether the vehicle has been reported as stolen,
the name, address, license number, and date of birth of the driver to whom the
vehicle is registered, as well as information regarding the vehicle itself. See id. at 46,
723 A.2d at 36. The MDT also advises the officer of the registrant's date of birth, eye
color, number of points accrued against the license, height, weight, and terms of the
license. See id. For a more specific discussion on police use of MDTs, see Darlene
Cedres, Mobile Data Terminals and Random License Plate Checks: The Need for Uniform
Guidelines and a Reasonable Suspicion Requirement, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
391, 394-96 (1997).
143 See Donis, 157 N.J. at 54, 723 A.2d at 40. The court stated,
"Petitioners assert
that police should not be permitted to process an inquiry ... until they observe a
driver commit an apparent motor vehicle violation. We disagree." Id. The Donis
decision involved two separate incidents in which police officers used the MDT prior
to making a motor vehicle stop. See id. at 48-50, 723 A.2d at 37-38. The two cases
eventually were consolidated by the appellate division, which issued a per curiam
opinion upholding police use of the MDTs. See id. at 50-51, 723 A.2d at 38. Donis
himself was stopped and issued a summons after a police officer received
information through use of the MDT that Donis's license was suspended. See id. at
48-49, 723 A.2d at 37. The police officer testified that prior to making the stop, he
observed that the driver of the vehicle was, consistent with the MDT description, a
short male. See id. In addition, the officer learned from the MDT that the
registrant's license was suspended. See id. In the companion case, a police officer
STAT. ANN.
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In another evaluation of Article I, paragraph 7 of the NewJersey
Constitution,'" the court, in an opinion by justice Garibaldi, began its
analysis by noting that states have a legitimate interest in preserving
highway safety by ensuring that only eligible drivers operate motor
vehicles.'4
The court then recognized that, in an effort to
accomplish its goals of promoting highway safety, the Legislature has
authorized the Division of Motor Vehicles to assemble and provide
law enforcement with relevant information regarding motorists46
The court further acknowledged that driving records historically are

who had entered over two hundred license plates of passing vehicles while parked at
an intersection finally obtained information via the MDT that registrant Heidi
Gordon's license was suspended. See id. at 49-50, 723 A.2d at 37-38. Because of his
close proximity, the officer was able to observe that the driver of the vehicle matched
the description of the registrant provided by the MDT. See id. To this end, the
officer stopped the vehicle and issued a summons. See id.
14
Petitioners argued that random use of the MDT violates the state constitution,
claiming that implicit within Article I, paragraph 7 "is the premise that there is a
zone of privacy wherein all individuals expect that what they say or do will be
protected from unreasonable government intrusion." Id. at 51, 723 A.2d at 38. The
State argued that the New Jersey Constitution "only requires that the expectation of
privacy be reasonable," and that drivers do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their licenses, registrations, and personal information. Id.
See id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979)). The court also
stated that NewJersey has adopted the United States Supreme Court's rationale with
respect to the State's interest in regulation of highway safety. See id. (citing State v.
Kadelak, 280 N.J. Super. 349, 360, 665 A.2d 461, 466-67 (App. Div. 1995)). Further,
the court remarked that all drivers must expect some infringement upon their right
to privacy. See id. at 51-52, 723 A.2d at 38 (citing New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 133
(1986)).
I4 See id. at 52, 732 A.2d at 38-39. "The Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles
has been authorized to collect data regarding proper restraints to be placed upon
motor vehicles and their ensuing use on public roads, thoroughfares and turnpikes
as required for public protection." Id.; see also NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39:2-3(c) (West
1982). In 1997, state legislation was enacted to place New Jersey in compliance with
the Driver's Privacy Protection Act. See Donis, 157 N.J. at 53, 723 A.2d at 39. The
Driver's Privacy Protection Act prohibits states from disclosing personal information
contained in motor vehicle records except under specific conditions. See 18 U.S.C. §
2721-25 (1996).
Congress passed this legislation in response to a number of
incidents in which information from the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) was used
to perpetrate violence against individuals whose records were contained in DMV
databases. See Donis, 157 N.J. at 53, 723 A.2d at 39. The New Jersey legislation
proscribes disclosure of "personal information about any individual obtained by the
[DMV] in connection with a motor vehicle record." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:2-3.4 (West
1982). The statute describes personal information as "information that identifies an
individual, including an individual's photograph; social security number; driver
identification number; name; address other than five-digit zip code; telephone
number; and medical or disability information." Id. The legislature, however,
provided an exemption for law enforcement purposes in matters of vehicle and
driver safety or theft. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39:2-3.4(c)(1) (West 1982).
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open to inspection, provided a citizen can demonstrate a beneficial
and legitimate interest in the information. 14
Against this backdrop, Justice Garibaldi suggested that police
should not be restricted to use of the MDT only when they perceive
an actual motor vehicle transgression. 8 The justice remarked that a
vehicle's license-plate characters, entered into the MDT to access
driver information, are in plain view and fully exposed to the
public. 4 9

Thus, an individual does not manifest a reasonable

expectation of privacy in his license plate and, consequently,
examination by law enforcement officers does not constitute a
search.'w The court further explained that the Legislature, when it
required that license plates be placed on the front and rear of each
vehicle, intended that a motor vehicle operator's identity be readily
identifiable. 5' The justice resolved, however, that the police should
operate the MDT through a two-step process that would effectively
enforce legislative intent while protecting unnecessary dissemination
of personal information. 52 In the first step of Justice Garibaldi's
framework, officers could access only license status of the registrant,
the registration status of the vehicle, and information concerning
whether the vehicle had been reported stolen.5 3 If the primary
information discloses a foundation for further investigation, police
may proceed with the second step, which allows officers access to
personal information, including name, residence, social security
number, and criminal record.'-" Justice Garibaldi stressed that police
officers must be trusted to comply with the directives of the court
until the MDTs are reprogrammed in accordance with the two-step
55
framework.'

See Donis, 157 N.J. at 52, 723 A.2d at 39.
See id. at 54, 723 A.2d at 40. Justice Garibaldi reasoned that "by the time an
officer observes a vehicle improperly change lanes or speed down the highway, that
officer no longer needs to use the MDT. The Officer has a permissible basis to
effectuate a stop." Id.
'49 See id. at 54-55, 723
A.2d at 40.
150 See id. (citing New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 144 (1986)). Although
Class
stands for the proposition that persons do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy with regard to vehicle identification numbers, Justice Garibaldi asserted that
the same logic should apply to license plates. See id. at 55, 723 A.2d at 40.
1 See id. (discussing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-33 (West 1982)).
147
148

152
153

14

See id.

See Donis, 157 N.J. at 55, 723 A.2d at 40.
See id. The justice maintained that this two-step procedure would adequately

safeguard officers from hazards when they stop vehicles. See id. at 56, 723 A.2d at 40.
1 See id., 723 A.2d at 41.
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CONCLUSION

The lions of the former activist New Jersey Supreme Court are
now departing."' Justices Stewart G. Pollock and Alan B. Handler
have retired, and in May 2000Justice Daniel J. O'Hern will reach the
age of seventy, the mandatory age of retirement for justices of the
New Jersey Supreme Court."" With these traditionally activist jurists
no longer on the bench, many believe the court will move in a new
conservative direction, while others are not so sure.158
One interesting factor to consider is the long-standing tradition
among NewJersey's governors to keep the court balanced in terms of
Democratic and Republican justices. 59 Logic would have it that this
tradition would result in a balance of judicial philosophies and
prevent the court from drifting too far in one ideological direction.
Notwithstanding this gubernatorial tradition, Governor Whitman's
most recent Democratic appointment was that of Appellate Division
Judge Virginia Long, who considers herself neither conservative nor
liberal.' 6 Perhaps political ideologies and judicial philosophies are
not as intimately connected as tradition initially would indicate. It is
also difficult to discern the extent to which practical and emotional
considerations have affected judicial philosophies
in the New Jersey
161
Supreme Court's recent privacy opinions.
Although this Comment analyzes the New Jersey Supreme
Court's recent narrowing of protections under Article I, paragraph 7

:56

See Perspective21st CenturyJustice,STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 20, 1999.

57 See id.

158 See id.

For example, State Senator Gerald Cardinale, a Republican from
Bergen County, believes that the court has begun to develop a sense of moderation.
See id. He believes, however, "the jury is still out." Id. In contrast, State Senator
Robert Martin, a Republican from Morris County, believes "the [New Jersey]
Supreme Court should become less activist, less liberal, [and] less legislative-minded"
after the newjustices take the bench. Id.
1
See Rocco Commarere, Whitman's Potential Legacy: Court of Her Making, 8 N.J.
LAw., Mar. 1, 1999, at 1. However, "it is possible [Governor Whitman] could fill a
Republican bench seat with a Democrat or vice versa." Id.
0 See Kathy Barrett Carter, Top Court Choice Earns GOP Cheers: Appellate's Long
Strikes Independent Stance, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),June 9, 1999, at 1.
161 See, e.g., NewJersey Transit PBA Local 304 v. NewJersey Transit Corp.,
151 N.J.
531, 536, 701 A.2d 1243, 1245 (explaining that receipt of federal transportation
funds by NewJersey Transit would be halted if NewJersey Transit did not implement
a drug testing program that encompassed its police officers). While considering the
merits of New Jersey Transit PBA, the justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court must
have visualized a severely underfunded system of public transportation in NewJersey.
Likewise, when deciding State ex rel. JG., N.S. and JT., the justices most likely
considered the emotional plight of a sexual assault victim after an attack. See generally
State ex rel.J.G., N.S. andJ.T., 151 N.J. 565, 701 A.2d 1260 (1997).
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of the New Jersey Constitution, the court continues to construe some
state statutes expansively. In Dale v. Boy Scouts of America,1 62 the court
determined that the Boy Scouts are a place of public accommodation
and, thus, under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, may not
exclude homosexuals.' 63 Further, the court held that the right to be
free from discrimination does not conflict with freedom of
association rights. 6 At first glance, this opinion appears to embrace
the sort of liberal activism that once defined the court."
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has also begun to chip
away at the long history of discrimination against homosexuals by
extending certain protections under the United States Constitution.' 66
In all likelihood, the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Dale was
a logical outgrowth of the United States Supreme Court's recent
movement in the direction of extending constitutional rights to
homosexual citizens. Although the New Jersey Supreme Court will
continue in its role as interpreter of the state constitution and state
statutes, the court apparently is more willing now to look to federal
precedent for guidance.
Scott Carbone

62 160 NJ. 562, 734 A.2d 1196 (1999).
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See id. at 603-04, 734 A.2d at 1218-19.
See id. at 608-10, 734 A.2d at 1221-22.
See Nancy Ritter, Decision on Gays in Boy Scouts: Defining Moment of Poritz Court?,

8 NJ. LAw., Aug. 9, 1999, at 1677. Ritter writes, "Three years after Chief Justice
Deborah T. Poritz took command of the Supreme Court of NewJersey, the court...
showed it might be a lot more liberal than some have speculated." Id. Other
columnists, however, take quite a different approach. See Scouting for Courage: The
Boy Scouts Should Abide by Their Own Teaching That No One Should Be Prejudiced,THE DES
MOINES REG., Aug. 14, 1999. "This ruling is hardly the work of some liberal judicial
activists. The careful and scholarly opinion for the respected New Jersey court was
written by Chief Justice Deborah Poritz, who was appointed by a Republican
governor. There were no dissents among the seven justices." Id.
166 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (holding
that a Colorado
constitutional amendment that prohibited inclusion of homosexuals in any group of
persons statutorily protected from discrimination violated the Equal Protection
Clause).

